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Possible Paths for GDP Per Capita – Simulation 
with a Demographic Growth Model*
Éva Berde – Izabella Kuncz
To begin our paper, we point out the importance of demographic growth models by 
highlighting the conceptual framework of overlapping generations. We define the 
formulas in our own model based on Lee – Mason (2010), modifying the original 
framework in several respects. We present the exogenous fertility and survival rates 
in different demographic scenarios, and then we derive the simulation paths for 
GDP per capita from these. A word of caution regarding our results: the simple 
structure of our model disregards several factors potentially influencing growth. 
When concentrating solely on the impact of changes in fertility and mortality rates, 
our simulation results suggest that a drop in the total fertility rate, even to slightly 
below the replacement level, and even in the context of a relatively high survival 
rate, may increase GDP per capita. However, in the case of an extremely low total 
fertility rate and a high survival rate, an economic downturn can be expected.
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1. Introduction
The exploration of the regularities in economic growth and the projection of 
potential future paths has excited economists since the emergence of economic 
thinking.1 Nevertheless, the significance of population numbers and structures 
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1  The first such efforts that can be cited appeared with the representatives of the classical school of 
economics. Smith (1776) not only presented the benefits of the division of labour, but also mentioned that 
the productivity growth that can be achieved through the division of labour increases economic prosperity, 
and facilitates the future development of the economy.
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only started to be taken into account in growth models much later.2 From the 
second half of the 1980s, as humanity entered the fourth stage of demographic 
transition, demographics determined economic developments to such an extent 
that demographic variables could no longer be left out of growth models.
In the fourth stage of demographic transition,3 the mortality rate steadily declines 
in almost all developed countries of the world, and in parallel with this, the total 
fertility rate (TFR) is even lower than earlier. The total fertility rate has dropped 
to below the replacement level several times, which portends serious problems 
for the future. Fulfilling the needs of the ageing population, and, more generally, 
maintaining the operation of the economy may prove to be highly difficult under 
such circumstances. While the total fertility rate of more developed regions drops, 
huge net population growth characterises certain less developed areas, due to a 
diminishing mortality rate combined with a high fertility rate, which, however, is 
still lower than earlier. In these countries, the future decrease in the total fertility 
rate and the further drop in the mortality rate are expected, and therefore it is likely 
that the share of the working-age population will soar temporarily. These trends 
may provide an economic stimulus to the countries concerned, and the beneficial 
effect of the so-called first demographic dividend4 can take hold (see, for example, 
Bloom et al. 2003, Mason 2005). Ultimately, even the ranking in the economic clout 
of the countries may change.
Out of the growth models, the changing demographic trends can be best captured 
by the so-called overlapping generations (OLG) model. In the study by Diamond 
(1965), which laid the foundations of OLG models, changes in the birth rate were 
still exogenous, however, it already differentiated between two age groups of 
the population. This framework was expanded by Auerbach – Kotlikoff (1987) to 
include further cohorts, and then the modelling tools were enhanced by Barro – 
Becker (1989). The article by Barro–Becker also treats the birth rate endogenously: 
therefore, the total fertility rate is quantified as a result of the processes in the 
model, and it has an impact on the development of the model’s variables.
Our paper draws conclusions with respect to the potential paths of economic 
growth using one of the overlapping generations models. The basic model we 
used, Lee – Mason (2010), uses a special approach as compared to the usual OLG 
models. Still, it is based on Diamond’s idea, i.e. the overlapping generations, and 
2  Malthus (1798) concentrated specifically on the negative impact of excessive population growth, but did not 
link this issue to the potential growth in productivity. Demographic factors were first taken into account in 
growth models by Solow (1956). The historical sequence of the demographic approaches to growth models 
is summarised in Table A1 in the Appendix.
3  For more on the demographic transition, see, for example, Van de Kaa (2010), Frejka (2016).
4  The first demographic dividend shows the difference between the growth rate of the weighted number of 
workers and the growth rate of a similarly weighted number of consumers. If the number of the so-called 
effective workers increases more (or falls less) than the number of effective consumers, that contributes 
to economic growth.
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the neoclassical growth model framework, in which economic growth is simulated 
as a function of the total fertility rate and the mortality rate. One simplification as 
compared to Diamond’s model is that this does not contain consumer optimisation, 
and one added, novel feature is that the expansion of human capital is among 
the explanatory variables of the model. Its core concept is the trade-off between 
quantity and quality as formulated by Becker (Becker 1960, Becker – Lewis 1973, 
Willis 1973, Barro – Becker 1989, Becker et al. 1990, Galor – Weil 1999), according 
to which adults spend more on their offspring when they have less children, i.e. 
they provide them with more human capital. As a result, when children grow up, 
their productivity increases, and therefore the impact of the lower total fertility rate 
can be offset. Our paper shows that the total fertility rate can drop to a critical level 
where the opportunity for growth is threatened, and society is unable to maintain 
the earlier level of GDP per capita. The study is structured as follows: after the 
introduction, in the second part, we describe Becker’s quantity–quality trade-off, 
and the corresponding theories. In Part 3, we will present our own model, and show 
in which aspects the framework developed by us differs, and to what extent, from 
Lee – Mason (2010). In Part 4, we use artificially constructed exogenous fertility and 
mortality rates, and simulate paths for GDP per capita based on the model of the 
previous part. We detail the demographic trends that the exogenous total fertility 
and mortality rates express, and why it is important to be aware of the impact these 
trends may have on economic growth. Part 5 comprises the summary of our study. 
Then in the Appendix we provide an overview of the historical development of 
growth models using demographics in a tabular form, and we also employ a table 
to show the values of the parameters in our model.
2. Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off
The basic idea behind the Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off is attributed to 
Becker (1960) in the literature. In short, the quantity–quality trade-off means that if 
there are many offspring in a family, less time and money are devoted to one, while 
in the case of fewer offspring, the expenses per child increase drastically. Similar 
approaches to the quantity–quality trade-off are discussed in Becker – Lewis (1973), 
Willis (1973) and Galor – Weil (1999). This issue, especially the global contraction 
of the total fertility rate, is very topical now. For example, Lee – Mason (2010) use 
statistical analysis to prove that in the countries in the NTA5 database, children 
with fewer siblings receive more human capital investments from their parents; 
therefore, they can work more efficiently as adults than their peers growing up 
in larger families. The link between the reduction in the total fertility rate and the 
increase in human capital investments may explain why production values increase 
5  NTA: National Transfer Accounts. The data can be found at http://www.ntaccounts.org/ (last accessed on 
20 September 2017).
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even if the share of the working-age population diminishes. Roudi-Fahimi – Kent 
(2007) provide an outstanding summary of the studies in connection with this idea.
Even the so-called synthesis theory, which treats the causal relationships in a 
complex manner, and which does not support the concept of the Beckerian 
quantity–quality trade-off (e.g. Adelman 1963, Freedman 1963, Silver 1965, 
Freedman – Coombs 1966a, Freedman – Coombs 1966b and Easterlin 1973) 
concedes that the decrease in the total fertility rate and the growing human 
capital investments occurred at roughly the same time in history. Further schools 
of thought other than the synthesis theory that distance themselves from Becker’s 
ideas explain the reduction in the fertility rate with several factors. These include the 
increase in female employment, economic crises, people’s love of comfort and the 
opinion of contemporaries (see, for example, Kaplan 1994, Black et al. 2005, Ellis 
2008, Luci – Thevenon 2010, Sobotka et al. 2011, Colleran et al. 2015, Dang – Rogers 
2016). And despite the apparent facts, the hotly debated Lawson – Borgerhoff 
Mulder (2016) study flatly rejects that there is any causality between human capital 
investments and the development of the total fertility rate. Nonetheless, these two 
authors admit that fertility has declined and the human capital invested in children 
has increased since the mid-19th century. Guo – Zhang (2017), partly in response 
to the paper by Lawson – Borgerhoff Mulder (2016), show that the reason why 
certain authors doubt the theory of the quantity–quality trade-off is a misguided 
interpretation of the facts.
One exception to Becker’s ideas could be that in the countries with an advanced 
public sector, all children have access to basic schooling and healthcare, regardless 
of the number of siblings. Yet Vargha – Donehower (2016) estimated the value 
of the so-called invisible transfers,6 i.e. the care and attention directly devoted 
to children by their parents. The two authors have confirmed that the children 
growing up among fewer siblings receive much more care in the countries with 
advanced public benefits than their peers living in large families, mainly because 
of the invisible transfers.
In our article, we base our model on the negative relationship between the number 
of children and human capital investments, i.e. we accept the causality derived 
from Becker’s ideas. We examine what would happen if this correlation determined 
the productivity of an economy, ceteris paribus. The impact of material capital 
and all the other factors is quantified only indirectly, through human capital, but 
it is indicated that sometimes material capital can be the driver of development. 
The approach examining the role of human capital ceteris paribus is increasingly 
common in the literature, in view of the drying-up of the first demographic dividend 
6  For more on the invisible transfers themselves, see Gál et al. (2016).
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and the increasingly dominant role of the second demographic dividend7 (e.g. Bloom 
et al. 2003, Mason 2005, Mason et al. 2016).
3. Our model
3.1. Differences between Lee – Mason (2010) and our model
Just as in the case of Lee – Mason (2010), our overlapping generations model is 
highly stylised. Our basic aim is to determine the impact of the population’s age 
distribution (and indirectly population numbers) on output per capita. Despite its 
stylised nature, it is important that the model be as realistic as possible.
From this perspective, taking into account four overlapping generations instead of 
the three, as in Lee – Mason (2010), provides enormous help in achieving better 
alignment with the facts. With three overlapping generations, those living until the 
end of the third period spend merely one-third of their life working, and live from 
the transfers provided by the others for two-thirds of their life. In the case of three 
generations, there is an unreasonably high number of children in any period in the 
context of the actual TFR. If we assume that Nt
working  is the number of workers and 
Ft is the fertility rate (for one person rather than one woman, which is usually the 
case in such models), then FtNt
working  children will be born altogether, and the share 
of the first generation will be disproportionately large, even when Ft is barely over 
1 (and the TFR is over 2). In the case of four generations, the people living until the 
end of the fourth period spend half of their lives working, and if the total number 
of workers in the two working generations is Nt
working , while the total fertility rate is 
Ft, then, assuming that the two working generations are roughly of the same size,8 
only Ft0.5Nt
working  children will be born. The share of children within society is much 
more realistic this way, just like the fact that people spend at least half, rather than 
a third, of their lives on the labour market. Those who die after the third period, 
work for two-thirds of their lives.
Accordingly, our model assumes two, rather than one, working generations 
living at the same time: they are the second and third generations in the model. 
These two generations resemble each other, but only the second generation can 
produce children. In addition, the income of the third generation is somewhat 
higher than that of the second. Our model does not differentiate between 
whether the transfers or the in-kind goods are provided to children (Generation 1) 
and the old (or pensioners, i.e. Generation 4 in our model) within the family or 
7  For a short description of the first demographic dividend, see Footnote 4. The second demographic dividend 
refers to the economic growth fuelled by the stronger human capital investments and the related physical 
capital investments.
8  The roughly same size of the two working generations is merely a stylised and momentary simplification, 
with the sole of aim of highlighting the magnitude.
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through redistribution. The overall benefits cover the consumption of children 
and pensioners, and guarantee the human capital investments in children. These 
benefits together are referred to as transfers.
Somewhat simplifying the complex correlations in reality, we assume in our model 
that both working generations divide their income based on the same principles 
between children’s transfer, their own consumption and the elderly’s consumption. 
Therefore, both working generations take part in caring for children,9 and the 
elderly have no savings at all, i.e. their livelihood depends completely on the 
transfers provided by the second and third generations.
The generations that do not work, i.e. children and the elderly, may receive transfers 
from the workers, with variable lower and upper limits, depending on certain factors 
in our model. Thanks to the limits, those who do not work receive at least minimal 
benefits, even in hard times. Furthermore, the limits also ensure that the workers 
do not have to spend on those who do not work beyond their means, even if the 
number of those who do not work is relatively high. The rules in the model that 
determine the way the income of the two working generations is spent also ensure 
that the simulation results are determined not only by the proportion of the size 
of the individual generations in the population, but also indirectly by the total 
population. Meanwhile, the amount spent on human capital investments from the 
transfers influences the productivity of the young workers in the next period, and 
of the older workers in the era coming after that.
Although in their model Lee and Mason quantify the fertility elasticity of human 
capital, as the embodiment of Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off, using actual 
statistical data and an econometric equation, the value of elasticity is a constant 
negative number. We did not regard the value of elasticity to be constant, but to be 
dependent on the total fertility rate. The details of the calculations are presented 
in Chapter 3.3.
3.2. Equations in the model
As described in the previous part, the economy in the model contains four 
overlapping generations:10 children (Nt
1 ), young workers (Nt
2 ), older workers (Nt
3 ) 
and pensioners (Nt
4 ). On average, the members of the young working generation 
produce Ft children in Period t. In the next period, children become economically 
active as young workers, and young workers become older workers. Finally, the 
latter’s st share will reach retired age, and the others die at the end of the third 
9  According to the model, both working generations finance children’s consumption and human capital, but 
they do not necessarily provide the transfers directly. The distribution in the model is similar to a system in 
which children receive the amount through central redistribution.
10  The population number of the generation where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 in Period t is denoted with Nit.
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period. The demographic transitions in the model are described in the following 
equations:
 Nt1 = Ft ⋅Nt2  (1a)
 Nt
2 =Nt−11  (1b)
 Nt
3 =Nt−12  (1c)
 Nt4 = st ⋅Nt−13 .   (1d)
Total population size in Period t.: Nt =Nt1 +Nt2 +Nt3 +Nt4 .
As indicated earlier, in our model Ft denotes the fertility rate for one person rather 
than one woman in Period t. Therefore, assuming an equal number of men and 
women in a stylised approach, our simulation used half of the TFR value actually 
possible. In our model, no one dies until the end of the third period, and those 
surviving the third period die only at the end of the fourth period, but then they do 
so for sure. Therefore, in our model, st is half of the statistically measurable survival 
rate in the third period. The development of Ft and st is also key in the model. The 
two exogenous ratios together determine the size and structure of the population 
in each period.
Only two working generations perform income-generating activities, and they 
receive wages for their work. The wage of young workers (Wt
2 ) depends on the 
amount of human capital they possess (Ht), which was accumulated in the previous 
period:
 Wt
2 = g Ht( ) ,  (2a)
where g’(Ht) > 0 and g’’(Ht) < 0. The wages of older workers are proportionately 
higher than that of younger ones, which is indicated by the parameter φ, the value 
of which used in our calculations can be seen in Table A2 of the Appendix.
 Wt
3 = f Wt2( )=ϕ ⋅Wt2 , (2b)
where φ > 1. 
Human capital is invested in children by the two working generations, spending ht 
of their income for this purpose. Equation (3) shows the amount of human capital 
of the young workers entering working age in Period t. In line with the assumptions 
in Lee – Mason (2010), Equation (3) presumes that everyone receives the human 
capital investments in childhood, and that this will determine their productivity 
when they become workers: 
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 Ht = h Ft−1( )⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( ) . (3)
Since only the two working generations have income, they finance their own 
consumption as well as that of the two dependant generations, and the human 
capital investments in children. Accordingly, the budget constraint is as follows:
 Wt2 ⋅Nt2 +Wt3 ⋅Nt3 ≥Ct1 ⋅Nt1 +Ct2 ⋅Nt2 +Ct3 ⋅Nt3 +Ct4 ⋅Nt4 +Ht+1 ⋅Nt1 . (4)
In line with the above, the amount of human capital investments financed from 
income depends on the total fertility rate, based on the following correlation:
 Ht =α ⋅Ft−1βt−1 ⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( ) ,  (5)
where α > 0 is the human capital investment ratio with one unit of F (replacement 
level). βt–1 is the elasticity of human capital investments as a function of Ft–1, which 
will be later referred to as fertility elasticity. This was fixed by Lee – Mason (2010) 
at an average value, but we made it dependent on the total fertility rate. The 
estimation of βt–1 is presented in Chapter 3.3.
The wage of the two working generations is
 Wt2 = γ ⋅Η !tδ = γ ⋅ α ⋅Ft−1βt−1 ⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( )( )δ , (6a)
where 0 < δ < 1, γ > 0 and substituting Equation (6a) in Equation (2b):
 Wt3 =ϕ ⋅γ ⋅ α ⋅Ft−1βt−1 ⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( )( )δ . (6b)
We would like to point out parameter γ in Equation (6b), the value of which was 
fixed at 1 in our model calculations, similar to Lee – Mason (2010) (see Table A2 
in the Appendix). If γ is greater than 1, this represents a sort of growth factor 
in the model. This growth factor can express the expansion in the efficiency of 
either human capital or physical capital. Since we currently aim to monitor the 
potential changes in fertility and mortality rates ceteris paribus, we utilised only 
one direct efficiency-increasing option in the model, the impact of human capital 
investments on the efficiency in production. Nonetheless, we allow for the option of 
the parameter γ being greater than 1 when our simulation is rerun. In this manner, 
the growth in the efficiency of physical capital can be modelled discretely.
Correlation (4) regarding the budget shows that the different generations can spend 
more money only at each other’s expense. Therefore, we had to incorporate limits 
in our model that prevent the potentially large first or fourth generations from 
burning through the income generated by the workers, leaving nothing to those who 
produced it. In addition, a similar limit had to be applied to prevent the opposite, 
i.e. we had to ensure that the two working generations provide at least minimal 
transfers to the first and fourth generations, even if there are many people in the 
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latter groups in a given period. Equations (7a) and (8a) below place caps and floors 
on the consumption of the elderly and children, respectively, using Ψt defined in 
Equation (7b), μt determined in Equation (8b) and νt established in Equation (8c).11 
The consumption of the fourth generation is: 
 Ct4 =Ψt ⋅ Wt2 ⋅
Nt
2
Nt
4
+Wt3 ⋅
Nt
3
Nt
4
−Ht+1 ⋅
Nt
1
Nt
4
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ , (7a)
where
 Ψt =min 0.25;
Nt
4
Nt
; 1.1⋅Nt−1
4
Nt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  . (7b)
The consumption of the first generation is:
 Ct1 = µt Wt2 ⋅
Nt
2
Nt
1
−α ⋅Ftβt ⋅Wt2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ +νt Wt
3 ⋅Nt
3
Nt
1
−α ⋅Ftβt ⋅Wt3
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ , (8a)
where
 µt =min 0.25;
Nt
1
Nt
; 1.1⋅Nt−1
1
Nt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  (8b)
 νt =min 0.25;
Nt
1
Nt
; 1.1⋅Nt−1
1
Nt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ . (8c)
The income left over after the payment of the transfers to the first and fourth 
generations is spent by younger and older workers on their own consumption:
 Ct
2 = 1− µt −Ψt( ) Wt2 −α ⋅Ftβt ⋅Wt2 ⋅Nt
1
Nt
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  (9a)
 Ct3 = 1−νt −Ψt( ) Wt3 −α ⋅Ftβt ⋅Wt3 ⋅Nt
1
Nt
3
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ . (9b)
The formula of GDP per capita, which in our model means income per person, 
should be expressed separately. This can be seen in Equation (10). This is because 
our simulation paths determine the development of GDP per capita.
 
GDPt
Nt
=Wt
2 ⋅Nt2 +Wt3 ⋅Nt3
Nt
 . (10)
11  The above-mentioned payment limits were incorporated in the model using the ratios Ψt, μt and νt. If the 
four generations are of the same size, and the available income (remaining after the payment of human 
capital) is distributed evenly among them, all generations receive 25 per cent of the income. Otherwise, 
in the case of generations of a relatively smaller size, the proportion of spending on their consumption 
changes in line with their share within the population, but it may rise by 10 per cent at most in a period 
to avoid extreme growth.
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Using the previous equations of the model, wage dynamics, i.e. the ratio of future 
and current wages, can be described as follows:
Wt+1
2
Wt
2
=
γ ⋅ α ⋅Ftβt ⋅ Wt2 +Wt3( )( )δ
Wt
2
= γ ⋅ α ⋅Ftβt( )δ ⋅ Wt
2 +ϕ ⋅Wt2( )δ
Wt
2
= γ ⋅ α ⋅Ftβt( )δ ⋅ 1+ϕ( )δ ⋅Wt2δ−1  (11a)
 Wt+1
3
Wt
3
= ϕ ⋅Wt+1
2
ϕ ⋅Wt2
. (11b)
In a steady state, wages are constant, and the wage of young workers is
 Wt
2* = 1γ ⋅αδ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
δ−1
⋅Ft
βtδ
1−δ ⋅ 1
1+ϕ( )δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
δ−1
, (12a)
while, when substituting Equation (12a) in (2b), the wage of older workers is 
 Wt
3* =ϕ ⋅ 1γ ⋅αδ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
δ−1
⋅Ft
βtδ
1−δ ⋅ 1
1+ϕ( )δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
δ−1
. (12b)
3.3. Estimating the fertility elasticity of human capital investments
In Chapter 3.1, we already indicated that Lee – Mason (2010) determined the value 
of the elasticity of human capital investments as a function of the total fertility rate 
to be negative but constant. The two authors used NTA (2009) data and found a 
significant negative correlation between the total fertility rate and human capital 
investments. However, they relied on this relationship as a generally occurring link, 
quantifying the elasticity of human capital investments as a function of the total 
fertility rate based on the average value.
By contrast, we employed elasticity that depends on the value of the total fertility 
rate. We used the average number of years spent in school (ISCED 1 or higher 
level studies) as a variable accurately representing the amount of human capital 
investments from the UNESCO (2016) database. The value of the total fertility rate 
was compiled from UN (2015), and in the end we had data for 98 countries.12 The 
countries were divided into two groups, one for the countries with a TFR of over 
2.1 (the replacement level), and the other for the countries below that. Using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method, we prepared regression estimates for the 
two country groups separately. In the case of high-fertility countries, the absolute 
value of the regression coefficient was significantly higher: βt = –0.8348, while it 
12  We were able to use data from far more countries than Lee – Mason (2010), who relied solely on NTA (2009).
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was βt = –0.273 in the low-fertility country group. After that, assuming a linear 
relationship13 between βt and the Ft fertility rate, βt was determined as follows:
 βt = – 0.4072 – 0.761 · InFt  . (13)
The values determined by Equation (13) fit well on the points represented by the 
total fertility rate and human capital investments of the 98 countries, and that 
is why this correlation was chosen in our model for estimating the elasticity of 
human capital investments as a function of the total fertility rate. If Ft < 0.588, βt 
would be positive, therefore in this range, Equation (13) conflicts with the theory 
based on which we quantified it. However, there was no such low total fertility 
rate in the statistical data, and we did not use such low Ft values in our simulation. 
Further research is necessary to confirm or reject the relevance of the Beckerian 
quantity–quality trade-off with respect to TFR values below 1.176. Yet during our 
model calculations, we never used such a low total fertility rate.
4. The relationship between the total fertility rate, the survival rate 
and growth based on our model’s correlations
The simple structure of our model facilitates simulation testing that examines the 
impact of changes in only the total fertility rate and the survival rate on economic 
growth, independent of other factors. These simulation calculations show the 
impact of the two aforementioned demographic indicators on the development 
of GDP per capita, all other factors being fixed. In other words, only the categories 
determining the size of the population14 change in our model, while everything 
else is constant.
Assuming simple correlations has both benefits and drawbacks. The most important 
benefits in this case are:
•  We can see the effects exerted by the simultaneous change in the total fertility 
rate and the mortality rate ceteris paribus.
•  We can analyse how the different paths of the total fertility rate and the mortality 
rate as compared to each other change per capita output.
•  We can highlight the cases when the expected demographic developments lead 
to a dangerous economic situation.
13  It was assumed that the points determined by the average total fertility rate and human capital investments 
(or, more precisely, its logarithm), can be connected with a straight line. The mathematical statement of 
this line can be seen in Equation (13).
14  There is no migration in our model.
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•  If demographic developments influence economic growth favourably, even 
temporarily, the projection helps the economy in utilising the positive trends as 
long as possible.
The drawbacks of the simple approach are the following:
•  Several factors can influence GDP per capita that cannot be derived from the 
development of the total fertility rate and the survival rate.
•  Our forecasts can stoke unreasonable fears if the negative impact of demographic 
factors can be offset.
•  Positive predictions can falsely suggest that nothing has to be done for economic 
growth, as the demographic drivers take care of that “on their own”.
Now we will present the GDP per capita values on the various simulated paths. 
During our simulations, both the total fertility rate (F) and the survival rate (s) were 
provided exogenously.15
The exogenous time series for F and s were determined in a way so that there would 
be cases when a high fertility rate nosedives, when the moderately high fertility 
rate stay roughly the same, and when the low fertility rate continues to decline. In 
parallel with this, the survival rate stagnates or grows in all cases. Therefore, we 
sought to find out how the various possible paths of the total fertility rate influence 
GDP per capita ceteris paribus, while survival rates do not drop. Of course, our 
model can be used to conduct simulations using several other fertility and mortality 
time series, although we mainly focused on the various, hypothetical and opposite 
paths of the total fertility rate, while assuming that the mortality rate values do 
not deteriorate at all.
We started our simulation from a steady state, from which the economy shifts 
due to the change in the total fertility rate and the survival rate. The values of the 
parameters used during the simulation can be seen in Table A2 of the Appendix. 
Similar to Lee – Mason (2010), the initial wage in the steady state is the wage value 
in the context of the given parameters and exogenous variables. After the total 
fertility rate and the survival rate start changing in each period, the economy shifts 
from this steady state, and later, when F and s do not change anymore, it converges 
towards a new steady state. Similar to Lee – Mason (2010), our study focused on 
the path towards the new steady state, i.e. the time of transition.
15  As a reminder: F is the fertility rate per person, and half of the expected TFR, while s is the survival rate, 
and half of the survival rate for 60 years of age supported statistically, since in the model those living to 
be 60 die at the age of 80.
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Several other authors have used a modelling technique in which the stationary 
condition of the economy was upset, and it was examined how the path leading to 
the new steady state developed. For example, Cipriani (2014) used a steady state 
of an OLG model to demonstrate the expected impact of rising life expectancy 
in the context of first an exogenous, then an endogenous total fertility rate. He 
wanted to find out how much pension will be paid to the members of the older 
generation. Becker et al. (1990) also examined the steady state and its stability 
using endogenous fertility and human capital. The model by Barro – Becker (1989) 
administered hypothetical shocks to the steady state, and monitored the values of 
the variables in the model. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) analysed the impact of the 
change in the mortality rate in the context of variable and constant educational 
attainment, and this model also started out from a steady state. To mention some 
Hungarian examples, Simonovits (2009) and Varga (2014) upset the steady state of 
their models, which were very similar to each other in many respects, and examined 
how the parametric pension reforms affected the sustainability of the pension 
system.
We also assumed in our model that the economy was in a stationary state in the 
0th period before modelling. Then the total fertility rates and mortality rates 
changed from period to period. We sought to find out how the changes shape 
GDP per capita. Table 1 contains the values of s and F used in the first and second 
simulation calculations in the 16 periods under review, while Figure 1 presents the 
development of GDP per capita corresponding to these (s,F) pairs.
The growth in GDP per capita along the first path clearly shows that if the initially 
very high total fertility rate continuously declines, even sinking well below the 
replacement level by the end of the period under review, GDP per capita may 
increase even in the context of a high survival rate. The survival rate increases 
steadily and at a relatively fast pace for 13 periods along the first path, and then 
during the final three periods, it stabilises at the high level achieved until then. 
GDP per capita grows even in these final three periods, although more moderately 
than before.
Table 1
Total fertility and survival rates along the first and second simulation paths
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Path 
1
F 3.50 3.15 2.84 2.56 2.31 2.08 1.87 1.69 1.52 1.37 1.23 1.11 1.00 0.90 0.81 0.73
s 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Path  
2
F 3.50 3.15 2.84 2.56 2.31 2.08 1.87 1.69 1.52 1.37 1.23 1.11 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.16
s 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
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The simulation was performed on Path 2 using the same survival rates as in Path 1, 
and the total fertility rates were also almost the same (Figure 1). The total fertility 
rate starts out from the same high level in the first period and then falls to the 
replacement level, just like along Path 1. However, upon reaching the replacement 
level, it starts increasing slightly instead of continuing on its downward path. In 
parallel with the hike in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita drops instead of 
growing as before. Therefore, our model suggests that if we use only the total 
fertility rate and the mortality (survival) rates as exogenous variables, the continuous 
contraction of the total fertility rate to any low level is favourable from an economic 
growth perspective under all conditions. Yet the simulation results along Paths 3 
and 4 (Table 2) highlight the fact that the drop in the total fertility rate can reach a 
drastic level in our model where it entails a decrease in GDP per capita.
Table 2
Total fertility and survival rates along the third and fourth simulation paths
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Path  
3
F 1.20 1.14 1.09 1.04 0.99 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.59
s 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49
Path  
4
F 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
s 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49
If the already high survival rate steadily increases, in an extreme case assuming for 
the last period that almost all 60-year-olds will live until retirement age, and thus 
Figure 1
GDP per capita values for Growth Paths 1 and 2 according to Table 1
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also live to be 80 in our model, GDP per capita falls in the context of an excessively 
contracting total fertility rate. Using the same hypothetical survival rate for our 
simulation calculations, but employing constant total fertility rates slightly above 
the replacement level, GDP per capita exhibits only a minimal decline. Nevertheless 
it seems that the development of GDP per capita is most affected in our model 
by the growth or decrease in the total fertility rate. This is also suggested by the 
simulation along Paths 5 and 6 (Figure 3).
The exogenous total fertility rates and survival rates of Paths 5 and 6 were provided 
based on a special consideration. The survival rates are the same in both versions, 
starting out from a moderately high level, and growing relatively slowly but steadily, 
and only the total fertility rates are different. Along Path 5, the total fertility rates 
that start out from below the replacement level increase continuously, right until 
the last period, where they are slightly over the replacement level. However, along 
Path 6, the total fertility rates that start out from a level more than twice the 
replacement level drop continuously. As a result of the above, the GDP per capita 
values along Paths 5 and 6 are quite different from each other. They continuously 
decline along Path 5, while they steadily grow along Path 6. The initial value is 
very low on Path 6, but after a consistent rise, it is only infinitesimally lower in 
the last period than the corresponding value on Path 5. The levels achieved on 
the paths should be compared to the values along the same path – one only need 
to think of the hurdles described at the beginning of the chapter – however, the 
contrasting development of the GDP values in the first and last periods clearly shows 
the opposing dynamics of the two paths.
Figure 2
GDP per capita values for Growth Paths 3 and 4 according to Table 2 
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Table 3
Total fertility and survival rates along the fifth and sixth simulation paths
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Path  
5
F 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.04 1.05
s 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44
Path  
6
F 2.10 2.00 1.90 1.81 1.73 1.65 1.57 1.49 1.42 1.35 1.29 1.23 1.17 1.11 1.06 1.05
s 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44
5. Summary
Our study summarised how, after the initially simple approaches, the various types 
of models analysing economic growth took into account the changes in the size 
and composition of the population. From the perspective of our present article, 
the simple OLG model presented in Lee – Mason (2010) is key. We performed our 
simulation calculations with a model that can be considered an enhanced version 
of Lee – Mason (2010).
Our simulation results clearly prove that we can draw many valuable conclusions 
even if, similar to the model by Lee and Mason, we assume that the only factors 
that determine the path of the OLG model are the total fertility rate and the survival 
rate. In such cases, the implicit level of physical capital is fixed, and the increasing 
efficiency of physical capital materialises in the expansion of the efficiency of 
Figure 3
GDP per capita values for Growth Paths 5 and 6 according to Table 3 
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human capital investments. Therefore, output per capita in itself does not provide 
meaningful information, however, the comparison of the levels by periods taught 
us many lessons.
The general trends observed in the model included the following:
•  The change in fertility influenced GDP per capita much more than the shifts in 
the survival rate.
•  The survival rate had a substantial impact when the total fertility rate was well 
below the replacement level. When the total fertility rate per person (for both 
men and women) was slightly below 0.6 after declining steadily from period to 
period, while the survival rate continuously increased, GDP per capita started to 
dip. In such cases, the survival rate, which increased and approximated 1 (meaning 
an s value converging towards 0.5 in our model at 60–80 years of age), prevented 
the growth of GDP per capita.
•  When comparing two simulation calculations in which the survival rates were 
the same in each period, we mostly saw that the increasing and more steeply 
increasing GDP per capita values were on the path along which the total fertility 
rates declined or declined more, even to below the replacement level. However, 
it was important not to let the total fertility rates fall as low as we described in 
the previous paragraph.
•  When on one of two model paths containing the same survival rates the total 
fertility rate increased from period to period from a low initial value, and it 
declined from an initial high level on the other path, the first path indicated a 
steadily decreasing output per capita, while the other exhibited a consistently 
expanding value, even if the total fertility rates were the same in the last period. 
These two simulations showed the most clearly that such models “reward” the 
reduction in population and “punish” population growth.
No hasty conclusions should be drawn from the above. For example we cannot 
say that a drop in fertility benefits economic growth, since the combined effect of 
several other factors also needs to be taken into account in connection with this 
issue. We should also not forget that if the Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off 
does not take hold, for example the parents do not provide substantial human 
capital investments to a low number of children, all the conclusions of our model 
instantly become unrealistic. Nonetheless, based on the simulation calculations of 
our model, in most cases it can be assumed that the gradual decrease of the total 
fertility rate to slightly below the replacement level has a beneficial effect on the 
development of GDP per capita.
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Appendix
A.1. Demographics in growth models
Since ours is a demographic growth model, the role of demographic variables in the 
development of growth models should be summarised. This can be seen Table A1.
Table A1
The role of population in the various growth models
Type of 
model
Creators of the 
model
The way population is taken into 
account
Size of the population, and its 
role in growth
Classical Thomas Robert 
Malthus
Population grows more rapidly 
than the amount of food.
Excessive population growth leads 
to lower prosperity.
Keynesian Roy F. Harrod, 
Evsey Domar
Exogenous savings ratio, no 
consumer optimisation.
Economic growth does not 
depend on it.
Neoclassical Robert M. Solow, 
Trevor W. Swan
There is no consumer 
optimisation, the labour force and 
productivity of the population 
influences economic output.
The change in exogenous 
population growth influences the 
development of income per capita 
only in the period of convergence 
towards the equilibrium growth 
path, and does not do so in the 
long term.
Neoclassical Frank P. Ramsey,
David Cass, 
Tjalling C. 
Koopmans
Households decide on their 
consumption and savings path, 
maximising their own utility.
Short-term dynamics diverge from 
the Solow–Swan model, but the 
increase in income per capita 
does not depend on exogenous 
population growth in the long 
run.
Endogenous 
growth
Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Paul M. Romer, 
Robert E. Lucas, 
Sergio Rebelo
The development of workers’ 
productivity is endogenous.
Using certain parametrisation, the 
externality and R&D based 
models exhibit a positive 
relationship between the 
exogenous population growth rate 
and the increase in GDP per 
capita.
Overlapping 
generations
Paul A. 
Samuelson, Peter 
A. Diamond
Alan J. Auerbach, 
Laurence 
J. Kotlikoff
There are several overlapping 
generations, maximising their 
lifetime utility.
Population growth is exogenous, 
but the composition of the 
population may vary, and there 
are transactions across 
generations.
Endogenous 
fertility
Gary S. Becker, 
Robert J. Barro
Utility-maximising households 
also decide about the number of 
offspring.
Fertility develops in line with the 
optimal consumer decision.
Growth 
models 
based on 
national 
transfer 
accounts
Ronald Lee, 
Andrew Mason 
Consumption and income 
indicators by age.
The impact of the first and second 
demographic dividend on growth 
depends on the composition of 
the population. 
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A.2. Parameter values used during the simulation
Table A2
Parameters of the model
Value Source
α = 0.075 Authors’ calculation based on the NTA (2016) 
database1
γ = 1 Lee – Mason (2010)
δ = 0.33 Mankiw et al. (1992), Lee – Mason (2010)
φ = 1.128 Authors’ calculation based on the NTA (2016) 
database2
1  The values of all the countries, 19 in all, for which the NTA (2016) contained complete data were taken 
into account (Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, United States). We found 
that the human capital investment rate (the share of education spending per child within the income 
of a 21–40-year old and that of a 41–60-year-old) was 0.075 on average.
2  The information from the 19 countries with complete data were taken into account (NTA 2016) here as 
well. We saw that the earned income of the workers in the age group of 41–60 was higher by 12.8 per 
cent on average than that of their peers in the age group of 21–40.
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